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Abstract—Noninterference provides a control over infor-
mation flow in a system for ensuring confidentiality and
integrity properties. In the literature this notion has been
well studied as transitive noninterference and intransitive
noninterference. In this paper we define a framework on
the notion of conditional noninterference, which allows to
specify information flow policies based on the semantics of
action channels. Our new policies subsume the policies of
both transitive and intransitive noninterference, and support
dynamic requirements such as upgrading and downgrading.
We also present unwinding relations that are both sound and
complete for the new policies.
Keywords-Information Flow; Noninterference; Unwinding;
I. INTRODUCTION
Information flow security policies are concerned with both
confidentiality and integrity requirements of a system. The
seminal work by Goguen and Meseguer introduces a way
of defining information flow security policies by a set of
noninterference assertions [17]. Each assertion specifies that
a given set of actions are not allowed to interfere with
a security domain. The follow-up works often interpret a
noninterference policy as a relation over a set of security
domains indicating permitted flow of information. If a policy
relation is transitive, it has a natural correspondence to
the classical multilevel security policies of Bell and La-
Padula [3], [4]. Therefore, until recently, most work in this
area defines a policy on how to allow information to flow
among security domains, instead of how to disallow such
flow as explored in the original paper.
The transitive noninterference policies are sometimes con-
sidered as too strong in many situations, because they require
that information flow is totally blocked from one security
domain to another at any time. A weakened version of
noninterference is to allow a policy relation to be intransi-
tive [32], [31], [42], [38]. This makes it possible to specify
a more flexible flow policy. For example, one may define a
policy  ⊆ {A,B,C} × {A,B,C} for a system with three
security domains, such that domain A is allowed to send
information to domain B by A B (i.e., (A,B) ∈ ), and
that domain B is allowed to send information to domain
C by B  C (i.e., (B,C) ∈ ). However, domain A is
not allowed to directly send information to C if (A,C)
is not in the policy relation  . In this case B may be
regarded as a channel that controls information flowing from
A to C, which is not expressible by the original (transitive)
noninterference policies [32]. The notions of transitive and
intransitive noninterference have been applied in different ar-
eas such as operating system verification [19], [26], security
protocol verification [1], [15], and programming language
analysis [33], [34].
However, it is also in the paper of Goguen and
Meseguer [17] that another weakened form called condi-
tional noninterference was proposed. Conditional nonin-
terference associates each noninterference assertion with a
constraint, in the way of A 6 u [[φ]], such that the noninter-
ference assertion takes effect (i.e., A becomes invisible to
u, as for confidentiality, or A is not allowed to change u, as
for integrity) whenever the constraint φ is satisfied. In other
words, A 6 u is conditional to φ. Although this notion is
not followed in subsequent works in the information flow
literature (to our knowledge), it proposes an insight that it
is also viable to place a control before information flow
is allowed to happen. Note that intransitive noninterference
only specifies how to allow information propagation after an
action of intended flow occurs.
In this paper, we present a policy framework for condi-
tional noninterference to incorporate both intransitive nonin-
terference [21] and the notion of the same name as presented
by Goguen and Meseguer [17]. (We overload this term
because we believe it carries the appropriate meaning.) We
are going to show that the noninterference assertions with
the additional conditions can be used to express not only
the channel control policies, but also some other useful
security requirements, including a certain class of policies
for dynamic control. From the perspective of channel con-
trol, our framework turns out more general than intransitive
noninterference in different ways.
Unwinding theorems [18], [32], [42] are useful techniques
to verify noninterference-based properties. Given a set of
noninterference constraints, it is possible to define a set of
unwinding relations for each user (or security domain), so
that if the relations satisfy a number of constraints, then
it is sufficient to say that a system is secure. Unwinding
is a very desirable technique since it reduces verification
of noninterference properties into conditions that are easily
provable by existing tools, with available examples applying
theorem provers PVS [10] and Isabelle/HOL [42]. The un-
winding theorem for deterministic state based systems is also
complete if the underlying security policy on interference
(i.e., the induced binary relation on the set of users) is
transitive [32]. However, the (weak) unwinding relations
in the literature [32], [42] are not necessary conditions for
intransitive noninterference even if the system is determin-
istic. In fact, the weak unwinding relation for intransitive
noninterference rather corresponds more or less to a notion
that is strictly stronger than the intransitive noninterference
properties [38]. In this paper, we define unwinding rela-
tions for more general classes of noninterference properties
which subsume intransitive noninterference. Nevertheless,
we prove that the existence of such unwinding relations are
both sound and complete for a system to be secure with
respect to the properties defined in this paper.
The main contributions of this paper are as follows. (1)
We apply conditional noninterference to express a variety
of security requirements, such as upgrading, downgrading,
and channel control. (2) We identify two subclasses of
conditional noninterference properties, and for each sub-
class we design a new unwinding technique which is both
sound and complete to the properties in this class in a
very general way. (3) As a byproduct, we show that a
subclass of our properties can be reduced to safety properties
by a doubling construction. The outline of the paper is
as follows. In Sect. II we define the system model and
rephrase the classical noninterference definition. Sect. III
presents conditional noninterference and shows how it can
be used to express many interesting security requirements. In
Sect. IV we define unwinding techniques to characterize the
conditional noninterference properties, and for a particular
class of policies, we reduce their verification problems to
safety properties. Sect. V discusses related work. Sect. VI
concludes the paper and suggests possible future research
directions.
II. NONINTERFERENCE
We define a state machine model similar to those that one
can find in the literature [17], [32]. We assume a (finite) set
of users (or security domains) U , a set of actions A, and a
function dom : A → U that maps each action to a user who
performs it. In our model, each action is associated with a
unique security domain, since in practice if there is an action
that is available to more than one users, we add distinct user-
names as subscripts to produce different actions. The tuple
(A, U, dom) is called a signature, based on which we write
Au as the set {a ∈ A | dom(a) = u} for u ∈ U . We write
a, b, a1, . . . to range over A.
A machine for a given signature (A, U, dom) is a tuple
of the form M = 〈S, s0, step, obs,O〉 where
• S is a set of states,
• s0 ∈ S the initial state,
• step : S ×A → S the transition function,
• obs : U × S → O the observation function,
• O is a set of outputs.
The function step describes the system transition, such that
step(s, a) is the unique next state when action a is applied
on state s. The function obs gives an observation made in
each state by a user. For readability, we ‘curry’ the function
obs by obsu of type S → O given u ∈ U . Note that such a
machine is always input enabled by the definition of function
step, so that every input action is enabled on every state.
Also, a machine is always deterministic in the sense that
given a state s and sequence of actions α ∈ A∗, a run
of state sequence can be uniquely determined. To denote
the final state after the execution of a sequence of actions,
define the operation • : S × A∗ → S, by s • ǫ = s, and
s • (α · a) = step(s • α, a) for s ∈ S, a ∈ A and α ∈ A∗.
We assume every state in a machine is reachable.
In this model we define observation on states, which
is different from the definitions of Rushby [32] where
observations are associated with actions. This distinction
is not essential for many security notions [39], including
noninterference. In literature the state-observed machines
have also been used by a number of authors, such as Goguen
and Meseguer [17] and Bevier and Young [5]. Our choice
on modelling of a machine is arbitrary.
The security policy we are to define assumes a partition
on the set of actions. Given a signature (A, U, dom), define
a partition Part over A satisfying the following conditions.
1) For all P ∈ Part, there exists u ∈ U such that
P ⊆ Au,
2) ⋃ Part = A,
3) P1 ∩ P2 = ∅ for all distinct P1, P2 ∈ Part.
We define a function part : A → Part that assigns each
action a unique partition. Obviously part refines dom .
A noninterference assertion T is of the form 〈P 6 u〉 for
u ∈ U and P ∈ Part, referring to a security requirement
that an action partition P is not allowed to interfere with a
user u.1 (With respect to integrity, this assertion could also
be interpreted as that actions in P are not allowed to ‘touch’
u, where u may represent a real entity, e.g., a device or a
file rather than a user.) In this case we say T controls P and
is associated with u. This definition is intuitively finer than
what is presented by Rushby [32] who defines interference
(the complement of noninterference) as a relation over the
set of users. We choose this structure for noninterference
assertions not only because it is seemingly finer and more
general, but also it seems more reasonable. When noninter-
ference is used to express complex security conditions, this
structure sometimes provides a more reasonable control. For
example, a user in charge of downgrading can avoid unnec-
essary downgrading of information by choosing actions not
1A similar form can be found in [17] where u|B 6 v is used to denote
that u is not allowed to interfere with v via the actions in B. We simplified
the presentation by explicitly defining action partitions to be associated with
unique security domains.
in the partition of downgrading actions.2 A noninterference
security policy is a set of noninterference assertions, for
which we use symbols such as Π,Π′.
Given a security policy Π and an action sequence α ∈
A∗ a function purgeΠ : A∗ × U → A∗ is introduced (as
in [17]) to clear away from α the actions that are not allowed
to interfere with a security domain u, which is inductively
defined by purgeΠ(ǫ, u) = ǫ, and
purgeΠ(a·α, u) =
{
purgeΠ(α, u) if part(a) 6 u
a · purgeΠ(α, u) otherwise.
A system satisfies noninterference, if for all u ∈ U and
α ∈ A∗, obsu(s0 • α) = obsu(s0 • purgeΠ(α, u)). Plainly,
this requires that removing all the actions not allowed
to interfere with a user is not noticeable by that user,
since it gives the same view to that user as the action
sequence in which no actions are removed. From the set
of noninterference assertions Π, a relation  ⊆ U × U of
interference is uniquely determined. Write u  v if there
exists a nonempty set of actions B ⊆ Au such that for
all noninterference assertions in the form of 〈P 6 v〉, we
have P ∩ B = ∅. We say that the noninterference policy is
transitive if the induced relation  is transitive on U .
Most of the policies studied in literature are transitive.
For example, MultiLevel Security of Bell and LaPadula [3]
defines a partial order of security domains.3 Later Denning
introduced a lattice structure of security classes to reason
about information flow [12]. Noninterference can be used
to analyze transitive information flow policies, but it is
not necessarily transitive by nature. To be explicit, the
relation  induced by a policy Π is not inherently transitive
according to the definition of function purge. We sketch it
in the following example.
(0, 0) (0, 1)
(1, 0) (1, 1)
av
av
au au
Figure 1. The machine of example 1, where a state s is labelled
(obsv(s), obsw(s)), and we omit the self-transitions by aw .
2As in the case of a channel control policy [21], [32] where u  v
and v  w, it seems more realistic to let only a subset of Av act as a
channel passing information from u to w. This may also be partially used
to defend criticisms against the purge-based channel control policies such
as those from Roscoe and Goldsmith [31].
3More precisely, it is defined as a combination of a totally ordered set
of security labels L such as top secret (TS), secret (S), confidential (C),
unclassified (U), where TS > S > C > U and a set of categories C,
such as Navy, Army and Air Force, which are pairwise incomparable, so
that (l1, c1) ≤ (l2, c2) with l1, l2 ∈ L and c1, c2 ∈ C iff l1 ≤ l2 and
c1 = c2.
Example 1: Let U = {u, v, w}, and a flow policy satisfying
u v and v  w, i.e., the set of noninterference assertions
is Π = {〈Av 6 u〉, 〈Aw 6 v〉, 〈Aw 6 u〉, 〈Au 6 w〉},
where Au = {au}, Av = {av} and Aw = {aw}. Let
S = {0, 1} × {0, 1} with s0 = (0, 0), obsu((x, y)) = ∅,
obsv((x, y)) = x and obsw((x, y)) = y for all x, y ∈ {0, 1}.
The transition function is defined as step(s, aw) = s for
all s, step((x, y), au) = (x ⊗ 1, y) and step((x, y), av) =
(x, y ⊗ 1) for all x, y ∈ {0, 1}, where ⊗ denotes ‘exclusive
or’. The machine is depicted in Fig. 1.
One may observe that u determines v’s observation and
v determines w’s observation in every state. Every non-
interference assertion can be verified via the purge func-
tion. For instance for the assertion 〈Au 6 w〉, we have
obsw(s0 · α) = obsw(s0 · purgeΠ(α,w)) for all α ∈ A∗.
Note that the relation  is not transitive, since (u,w) 6∈ ,
although we have u v and v  w. 
We claim that Goguen and Meseguer’s noninterference
policy is not necessarily transitive, and moreover, it can
be used to encode security properties stronger than those
that are known as intransitive noninterference or channel
control policies [21], [32]. In the above example v can
pass information from u to w only after he indeed receives
and knows the information. Furthermore, v is allowed to
intentionally block information from u to w, although infor-
mation is free to flow from u to v and from v to w. This
example provides a view on the notion of noninterference
of Goguen and Meseguer that it also gives a channel-like
control which works differently from that of intransitive
noninterference. Note that in intransitive noninterference
policies, it is possible that a channel is allowed to forward
information without knowing what is being forwarded [38].
III. CONDITIONAL NONINTERFERENCE
Conditional noninterference was introduced to support
dynamic policies [17], where the conditions were predicates
on a sequences of actions before reaching a state. In this
section the notion is extended also to the other direction
(similar to intransitive noninterference), so that conditional
noninterference decides whether an action is allowed to
interfere with a user given a path of actions leading to the
current system state as well as the possible future actions to
be performed.
We define conditional noninterference assertion to be of
the form 〈P 6 u [[φ]]〉, where the condition φ is a function
of type A∗×A×A∗ → {true, false}. Given a sequence of
actions α ∈ A∗, a single action a ∈ A, and another sequence
of actions α′ ∈ A∗ to be executed in the future, φ(α, a, α′)
answers whether the current action a is allowed to interfere
with user u, i.e., whether it needs to be ‘purged’. The
sequence α can be understood as the pre-conditional part of
the whole sequence α ·a ·α′ for φ, so that a decision is made
based on history. The sequence α′ represents the actions yet
to be performed. This part enables us to define a policy
that permits information flow only after it is checked by
other users, which has been already explored in the form of
intransitive noninterference or channel control policies [21],
[32]. We regard α′ as the post-conditional part of α · a · α′
for φ on action a. If φ is always evaluated true in assertion
T = 〈P 6 u [[φ]]〉, then T is a strict assertion, and it is
equivalent to what is defined in the previous section. To
this point we revise the notion of security policy to be a
set of conditional noninterference assertions. We have the
following definition for the new purge function.
Definition 1: Given a policy Π, the function purgeΠ :
A∗ × U → A∗ is defined as for all α ∈ A∗ in the form
of a1a2 . . . an, purgeΠ(α, u) = a′1a′2 . . . a′n, such that for
every i ∈ {1, . . . , n},
a′i =


ǫ if there exists 〈part(ai) 6 u [[φ]]〉 ∈ Π
and φ(α−i, ai, α+i),
ai otherwise.
where α−i = a1 . . . ai−1, α+i = ai+1 . . . an, and ǫ denotes
the empty sequence of actions.
A system is secure with respect to a policy Π, if for all
u ∈ U and α ∈ A∗, obsu(s0•α) = obsu(s0•purgeΠ(α, u)).
This requires that every user u ∈ U is unable to distinguish
trace α and purgeΠ(α, u) by his observations.
In the rest of the section, we restrict our attention to
two subclasses of conditional noninterference assertions. For
each class of assertions, we define its corresponding purge
functions. We will also show how these assertions can be
applied to express a few existing policies of interest.
A. Pre- and Post-Conditional Assertions
We define two subclasses of conditional assertions. A pre-
conditional assertion provides a control when a decision on
permitted information flow needs to be made ahead of time.
For example, in a system with discretionary access control, if
a user wishes to receive information from a different user, he
may simply create a file which he can read, and delegate the
‘write’ access of this file to that particular user. He may also
revoke this access in the future. A post-conditional assertion
controls flow of information after an action with intended
flow is performed. An example for this policy is that a secret
message must be followed by an encrypting action before it
is allowed to be sent out. Note that in many circumstances,
such decisions on permissions of information passage can
only be made by a super-user or an administrator.
We start with a simple language Φ− for expressing the
pre-conditional and post-conditional assertions as shown in
Fig. 2. The superscripts ‘pre’ and ‘post’ denote whether a
constraint is defined in a pre-conditional or post-conditional
assertion, and the arrows ‘ր’ and ‘ց’ denote upgrading
channels and downgrading channels, respectively. A post-
conditional assertion only asserts a condition under which
an already-taken action is allowed to produce effect. For
example, the assertion 〈P 6 u [[[P1P2]preց ]]〉 disallows
partition P to interfere with u unless it is immediately
φpre := [
←
C1 ∪
←
C2 ∪ · · · ∪
←
Cn]
pre
ր | [
←
C1 ∪
←
C2 ∪ · · · ∪
←
Cn]
pre
ց
φpost := [
→
C1 ∪
→
C2 ∪ · · · ∪
→
Cn]
post
→
←
C:= C | C♦ |
←
C C |
←
C C♦ C := P | P ∪ C
→
C:= C | ♦C | C
→
C| ♦C
→
C P := P1 | P2 | . . . | Pn
where Pi ∈ Part for 1 ≤ i ≤ n for some n
Figure 2. syntax of the constraints in Φ−
preceded by an action in P1 followed by an action in P2,
and the assertion 〈P 6 u [[[♦(P1∪P2)]post→ ]]〉 allows actions
from P to be detectable by u only if somewhere in the future
an action in P1 ∪ P2 is performed. In this case, the symbol
‘♦’ resembles its usage in temporal logics, in the sense that
the actions in the next partition (or union of partitions) are
not necessarily to happen immediately after, but within a
finite distance in the action sequence. We define the post-
conditional assertions in the way of controlled release of
information, and such release is regarded as irreversible.4
For the semantics of Φ−, every channel inside an assertion
is interpreted as a regular expression. Let [[.]] be a function
from Φ− to regular expressions. For a channel constraint
←
Ci= W1W2 . . .Wn (or
→
Ci for the post-conditional case)
where Wi ∈ {♦}∪P(A), define [[
←
Ci]] as the regular language
represented by W ′1W ′2 . . .W ′n where W ′i = A∗ if Wi = ♦
and W ′i = Wi otherwise. Given φ =
←
C1 ∪
←
C2 ∪ . . .
←
Cn,
we have [[φ]] = [[
←
C1]] ∪ [[
←
C2]] ∪ . . . [[
←
Cn]], i.e., the union of
the languages of all the channels. The semantics for post-
conditional constraints are defined in a similar way. Given
an assertion 〈P 6 u [[φ]]〉, α, α′ ∈ A∗ and a ∈ A,
- if φ is in the form of [φ′]preր , then φ(α, a, α′) = true
iff α ∈ A∗[[φ′]],
- if φ is in the form of [φ′]preց , then φ(α, a, α′) = false
iff α ∈ A∗[[φ′]],
- if φ is in the form of [φ′]post→ , then φ(α, a, α′) = false
iff α′ ∈ [[φ′]]A∗.
Note that the formal interpretation over the upgrading
channels and downgrading channels are different. For an
upgrading assertion 〈P 6 u [[[φ]preր ]]〉, if a pre-conditional
sequence α matches the pattern, i.e., α ∈ A∗[[φ]], the fol-
lowing action (if in P ) must be purged. However in the case
of downgrading that action must not be purged. The post-
conditional assertions only act as downgrading channels.
The usage of the terms ‘upgrading’ and ‘downgrading’ are
intuitive for both confidentiality and integrity specifications.
An upgrading assertion 〈P 6 u [[[φ]preր ]]〉 allows actions in
P to interfere with u (for confidentiality) or u is changeable
4On the other hand, pre-conditional assertions are allowed to revoke a
“permission” to cause flow as long as the actions under control are not yet
performed.
by P (for integrity) as default, until a pattern in [[φ]] occurs,
after which the policy becomes more strict. An interpretation
for downgrading assertions could be made in a similar
way. Plainly, every conditional assertion is weaker than its
corresponding strict assertion that is generated by removing
its conditional part.
B. Examples
We sketch two examples to show that conditional policies
can be used to express several useful security requirements
related to information flow.
Example 2: (book-keeping) We present a simple example
of well-formed transactions to ensure data integrity by Clark
and Wilson [9]. Assume there is a company with a number
of employees. A shared data-base B is in the company’s
IntraNet from which every user is allowed to retrieve in-
formation. A user can modify B, but this is only allowed
immediately after he has registered (or authenticated) him-
self into the system. This is a basic integrity requirement.
Database B is modelled as a user with no actions, and its
observation on the system is just its contents. For a user E,
his action set AE can be partitioned into the set of reading
operations ArE , the set of writing operations AwE and the
book-keeping action {abkE }. The information flow constraints
with respect to the security requirement thus can be stated
as follows for each user E.
(1) E’s reading actions are not allowed to change B, which
is the assertion
〈ArE 6 B〉
(2) E’s writing actions are allowed to modify B only if that
action occurs immediately after a book-keeping action. An
assertion for this rule is
〈AwE 6 B [[[{a
bk
E }]
pre
ց ]]〉
(3) Finally, the action abkE also needs to be constrained. If it
is not immediately followed by a write operation, it should
not affect any part of the database. So we have
〈{abkE } 6 B [[[A
w
E ]
post
→ ]]〉

The above example illustrates how actions need to be bun-
dled together in order to become a well-formed transaction.
The book-keeping operation serves as a downgrading action
on the integrity level of B, after which the employee E
is allowed to modify B. The next example presents an
upgrading policy.
Example 3: (conflict of interest) In a small town two sales
companies u and v, which compete with each other, are
seeking helps on their business strategies. There is only one
consulting company available in that town. If both u and v
connect themselves to the consulting company, it raises the
requirement that for each individual consultant c, once he
contacts one company of u and v, he will not be allowed
to consult the other, so that he cannot play two-sides. This
requirement resembles the Chinese Wall security policy [7].5
We regard both u and v as users with action sets Au and
Av . For each consultant c, we assume the set of actions he
can do is fixed as Ac, which can further be split into disjoint
sets Auc and Avc which are supposed to be used to exchange
messages with u and v, respectively.
(1) Initially, it is required that the companies u and v are
not allowed to leak information to each other, which can be
sketched as
〈Au 6 v〉 and 〈Av 6 u〉.
(2) The actions for c to communicate with u are not
supposed to have any effect on v, so that v’s view over the
system should not be changed by actions in Auc . Similarly,
Avc is not allowed to alter u’s view. Therefore we have the
following assertions.
〈Auc 6 v〉 and 〈Avc 6 u〉.
(3) Once c starts consulting u (or tries to access u), he
should be immediately disallowed to communicate with v.
This is defined over the action partition Auc to company v.
For the effect from partition Avc on company u, we define
the same assertion.
〈Auc 6 u [[[A
v
c♦]
pre
ր ]]〉 and 〈A
v
c 6 v [[[A
u
c♦]
pre
ր ]]〉
(4) However, it is also possible that c listens to u before
he starts to communictate with v, so that he can pass
information from u to v in an undesired way. Therefore
we disallow actions by u to reveal information to c before
c shows his intention to consult u. This can be sketched by
the following assertions.
〈Au 6 c [[[A
u
c♦]
pre
ց ]]〉 and 〈Av 6 c [[[A
v
c♦]
pre
ց ]]〉
In this example the actions in Auc upgrade the information
flow policy on Avc to v, i.e., once an action in Auc is
performed, the policy becomes more strict on the actions in
Avc , and vice versa. A reasonable consequence of this policy
is that once a consultant tries to communicate with both
companies, he will be forbidden to consult both companies
thereafter. 
5A Chinese Wall policy is concerned with the information flow among
all the consultants and consulting companies. It has two basic rules: (1)
Each consultant is allowed to access at most one company’s files in each
conflict of interest class, which is known as simple security property. (2)
Each consultant can write to a company’s files only if he has never accessed
any other company’s file, which is known as ⋆-property. Here we focus on
how to prevent information flow between the companies with respect to
a particular consultant. We do not prevent an individual consultant from
reading one company’s file after he has read the other’s, as long as this
action does not cause information flow between the two companies, in
which sense our policy is weaker than the Chinese Wall policy.
C. More on Pre-Conditional Assertions
The conditional noninterference assertions based on the
constraints defined by Φ− in Fig. 2 are easy to understand
and use, but it might not be general enough to catch more
complicated security requirements. For example, it is not
possible to have an assertion by Φ− to allow an action to
act as both downgrading and upgrading in the way of a
power switch. In this section, for pre-conditional assertions,
we define a more general policy language to achieve better
expressiveness. The policy language Φ is defined as regular
expressions on Part.
φ := ∅ | P | φ ∪ φ | φ · φ | φ∗
where P ∈ Part.
We use A\P to denote
⋃
{P ′ ∈ Part | P ′ 6= P}. A pre-
conditional noninterference assertion is thus in the form of
〈P 6 u [[φpre]]〉, where P ∈ Part, u ∈ U and φ ∈ Φ. The
function φpre : A∗×A×A∗ → {true, false} is defined as
φpre(α, a, α′) = true iff α ∈ L(φ). When it is applied to
purge an action sequence, the constraint φpre removes every
action a in partition P from α · a · α′, whenever α is in the
regular language L(φ) expressed by φ in the pre-conditional
assertion 〈P 6 u [[φpre]]〉. In particular, the constraint ∅
does not purge any actions, and A∗ purges everything, if
they appear within an assertion.
Given a user u ∈ U , we define a partial order relation
≤u on the set of conditional assertions associated with u.
Say an action sequence a1a2 . . . an is contained in another
sequence α if there exists α0, α1, . . . αn ∈ A∗ such that
α0 · a1 · α1 · a2 · α2 . . . an · αn = α. Let T1 and T2 be two
assertions associated with u, T1 ≤u T2 if purge{T2}(α, u)
is contained in purge{T1}(α, u) for all α ∈ A
∗
. Intuitively,
this means assertion T2 is stronger than assertion T1, i.e.,
the language accepted by the constraint in T2 is a superset
of the language accepted by the constraint in T1.
Lemma 1: For the general pre-conditional assertions,
〈P 6 u [[φpre1 ]]〉 ≤u 〈P 6 u [[φ
pre
2 ]]〉 implies L(φ1) ⊆ L(φ2).
This further induces an ordering on the set of policies, such
that given two policies Π1 and Π2, Π1 ≤u Π2 if for all u ∈
U , and T1 ∈ Π1, there exists T2 ∈ Π2 such that T1 ≤u T2.
Proposition 1: For every pre-conditional assertion T1 =
〈P 6 u [[φpre]]〉 with φ ∈ Φ−, there exists a constraint
ψ ∈ Φ, such that the assertion T2 = 〈P 6 u [[ψpre]]〉
satisfies T1 ≤u T2 and T2 ≤u T1.
Proof: Trivial, since every pre-conditional constraint in
Φ− expresses a regular expression.
Note this implies that the distinction between downgrading
and upgrading assertions in Φ− no longer exists in Φ. Since
the regular language is closed under complementation,6 if
R ∈ Φ expresses a downgrading channel [φ]preց , there always
6The author is not sure if it makes sense to have a more general policy
language which might not have such good closure properties, e.g., CFL.
exists another expression R− ∈ Φ expressing [φ]preր , such
that R ∩R− = ∅ and R ∪R− = A∗.
The other direction of Prop. 1 does not hold. Following the
claim we made at the beginning of the section, the assertion
〈P 6 u [[((A\Q)∗(Q(A\Q)∗Q(A\Q)∗)∗)pre]]〉 allows the
actions in Q to act as a switch. Even occurrences of actions
in Q disallows P to interfere with u, while an odd number
of actions in Q allows P . This is an assertion that expresses
a policy mixed with upgrading and downgrading, which is
not expressible by Φ−.
D. Avoiding Inconsistencies
Assertion conflict happens when two assertions associated
with the same user and controlling the same partition dis-
agree on whether an action needs to be purged. To resolve
this problem, we may take a more secure choice (as stated in
Def. 1) by insisting that an action needs to be purged from a
sequence if there exists an assertion that returns true. Never-
theless this may cause a policy to be potentially stronger than
what is expected by a (careless) policy specifier. Formally,
two assertions T1 = 〈P 6 u [[φ1]]〉 and T2 = 〈P 6 u [[φ2]]〉
are in conflict in a policy, if there exists α, α′ ∈ A∗ and
a ∈ P , such that φ1(α, a, α′) 6= φ2(α, a, α′). Say a policy
is simple, if for every P ∈ Part and u ∈ U , there is at
most one assertion that controls P and is associated with u.
In this paper we only discuss simple policies.
Nevertheless, two conditional assertions may conflict each
other according to our intuition of permitted information
flow even in a simple policy. For example, let a post-
conditional assertion T1 = 〈P1 6 u [[[♦P2]post→ ]]〉 be an
assertion that allows P1 to interfere with u only via a channel
provided by P2. This assertion is intuitively conflicting the
assertion T2 = 〈P2 6 u〉 which disallows P2 to interfere
with u in all circumstances. Since P2 is allowed to control
information from P1 to u in T1, the information passed
from P1 to u carries a ‘permission’ from P2, which seems
undesirable. We propose the following conditions to monitor
this type of inconsistencies from a policy.
Definition 2: Given a signature (A, U, dom) and a partition
Part,
- a policy Π is left-consistent if for all u ∈ U and
for all α, α′ ∈ A∗, purgeΠ(purgeΠ(α, u) · α′, u) =
purgeΠ(α · α
′, u),
- a policy Π is right-consistent if for all u ∈ U and
for all α, α′ ∈ A∗, purgeΠ(α · purgeΠ(α′, u), u) =
purgeΠ(α · α
′, u).
Intuitively, suppose the effect of action a depends on the
existence of action b, then the conditions that determine the
effect of b should be consistent with the conditions that
determine the effect of a. A policy being left-consistent
(right-consistent) requires that the existence of every action
in a purged sequence is consistent with the existence of every
other action appearing to the left (right) of that action in the
sequence. Obviously, a simple policy consisting of only strict
assertions is both left-consistent and right-consistent.
E. Encoding Intransitive Noninterference
Intransitive noninterference [21], [32] defines an
information flow policy as a (reflexive) binary relation  
over the set of security domains U , where u v indicates
that u is allowed to interfere with v, and is not necessarily
transitive on U . The ipurge function of type A∗×U → A∗
can be defined as follows.7 Given u ∈ U and α ∈ A∗ in
the form of a1a2 . . . an, ipurge(α, u) = a′1a′2 . . . a′n, such
that for every i ∈ {1, . . . , n},
a′i =
{
ai if ai+1ai+2 . . . an contains an interference chain,
ǫ otherwise.
where an interference chain is a subsequence b1b2 . . . bm
that is contained in ai+1ai+2 . . . an, satisfying that
dom(ai)  dom(b1), dom(bj)  dom(bj+1) for all
1 ≤ j ≤ m − 1, and dom(bm)  u. A system is
secure with respect to intransitive noninterference (of
policy  ), if for all u ∈ U and α ∈ A∗, we have
obsu(s, α) = obsu(s, ipurge(α, u)).
We show that the conditional noninterference policies sub-
sume the intransitive noninterference policies by using only
post-conditional assertions. Given a signature (A, U, dom)
and an intransitive noninterference policy  ⊆ U × U , we
construct a policy Π( ) as follows. First we let Part =
{Au | u ∈ U}. For every pair of users u, v ∈ U , we
construct the set Interf(u, v) = {v1v2 . . . vn ∈ U∗ |
u  v1  v2  . . .  vn  v}. In this set we
enumerate all possible interference chains from user u to
user v. (This set could be infinite.) Define a condense
operator Cond : 2A∗ → 2A∗ by Cond(TSet) = {α ∈
TSet | ∀α′ ∈ TSet : α contains α′ ⇒ α = α′}. This
operator is to remove all redundant and cyclic chains in a
set Interf(u, v), so that the remaining condensed set is
minimal. For example if u  v, then neither the chain
u  w  v nor the chain u  w  u  v will
provide any additional information on purging actions in
Au with respect to user v. Moreover, such a condensed set
will always be finite provided that U is finite. We define
Π( ) as a set consisting of the following assertions. For all
distinct u, v ∈ U ,
1) if Interf(u, v) = ∅, then 〈Au 6 v〉 is an assertion
in Π( ),
2) if Interf(u, v) 6= ∅ and Cond(Interf(u, v)) 6=
{ǫ}, then 〈Au 6 v [[[λ1 ∪ λ2 ∪ · · · ∪ λn]post→ ]]〉 is
an assertion in Π( ), where {λ1, λ2, . . . , λn} =
Cond(Interf(u, v)).
The correctness of the above construction of Π( ) is by
the following result, with its proof sketch in the appendix.
7The ipurge function in the original paper of Haigh and Young [21] is
defined in a different way, but semantically equivalent to the definition here.
Proposition 2: Given an intransitive noninterference pol-
icy  , for all u ∈ U and α ∈ A∗, ipurge(α, u) =
purgeΠ( )(α, u).
Next we show that intransitive noninterference policies
are always right-consistent.8 The proof of right-consistency
requires the following lemmas, which basically show that
the ipurge functions are idempotent and they preserve all
the interference chains in the results.
Lemma 2: For all α ∈ A∗ and u, v ∈ U , the sequence α
contains an interference chain from u to v iff ipurge(α, v)
contains an interference chain from u to v.
Lemma 3: ipurge(ipurge(α, u), u) = ipurge(α, u) for all
α ∈ A∗ and u ∈ U .
Proposition 3: Every intransitive noninterference policy is
right-consistent.
Proof: Given a policy  , u ∈ U and α, α′ ∈ A∗, we
show ipurge(α′ · α, u) = ipurge(α′ · ipurge(α, u), u). We
prove by induction on length of α′. Base case: ipurge(ǫ ·
ipurge(α, u), u) = ipurge(ǫ · α, u) is by Lem. 3.
Suppose ipurge(γ · ipurge(α, u), u) = ipurge(γ ·α, u) for
some γ ∈ A∗, we show the case for a · γ.
• If ipurge(a · γ · α, u) = a · ipurge(γ · α, u), then there
exists an interference chain in γ ·α from dom(a) to u.
W.l.o.g, we write a1a2 . . . aiai+1 . . . an to be the chain
where a1a2 . . . ai is contained in γ, and ai+1 . . . an
is contained in α. Then ai+1 . . . an is an interference
chain from dom(ai) to u by definition. Then there
is also an interference chain η from dom(ai) to u
in ipurge(α, u) by Lem. 2, so a1a2 . . . an · η is an
interference chain from dom(a) to u in γ ·ipurge(α, u).
Therefore ipurge(a ·γ · ipurge(α, u), u) = a · ipurge(γ ·
ipurge(α, u), u). Then we have ipurge(a · γ · α, u) =
ipurge(a · γ · ipurge(α, u), u) by pre-pending action a
on both sides of the induction hypothesis.
• If ipurge(a ·γ ·α, u) = ipurge(γ ·α, u), then there does
not exist an interference chain in γ ·α from dom(a) to
u. Therefore there does not exist an interference chain
in γ · ipurge(α, u) which is a shorter sequence. Then
we have ipurge(a · γ · ipurge(α, u), u) = ipurge(γ ·
ipurge(α, u), u). Then we have the result by induction
hypothesis.
Since the effect of ipurge on the policy  is the same
as that of purgeΠ( ), every policy Π( ) encoding an
intransitive noninterference policy  is right-consistent.
Together with the unwinding characterization for policies
of post-conditional assertions in Sect. IV, this result makes
it possible to reason about security with respect to intran-
sitive noninterference by unwinding theorems that are both
8Note that intransitive noninterference policies are not necessarily left-
consistent, since a prefix of a sequence does not necessarily contain an
interference chain even if the whole sequence does. However, intuitively,
left-consistency is not important for intransitive policies which only place
controls after an action is performed.
sufficient and necessary. This allows us to verify security
properties that are related to intransitive information flow in
a variety of areas (such as operating system and security
protocol verification) in a more precise way.
Moreover, our policy language on post-conditional as-
sertions is strictly more expressive than the policies of
intransitive noninterference, even in the case of Part =
{Au | u ∈ U}. An example could be a four-user system
with U = {H,D1, D2, L}, on which we have a policy with a
single assertion 〈AH 6 L [[[♦AD1♦AD2 ]post→ ]]〉, but neither
AD1 nor AD2 is restricted from interfering with L. This
policy asserts that an action from H must be approved by
both D1 and D2 in the particular order before being passed
on to L, and D1 is allowed to pass information to L in a
way independent to the actions from D2. This policy is not
expressible by intransitive noninterference. Moreover it is
not hard to show that such policy is still right-consistent.
IV. UNWINDING RELATIONS
Unwinding provides a verification technique on noninter-
ference-related security requirements. An unwinding theo-
rem reduces the verification of an information flow security
problem into the existence of a set of relations satisfying
certain properties, which is thus easier to be formalized
and verified by existing tools such as proof assistants and
model checkers.9 In this section we present general forms of
unwinding theorems for the two classes of conditional non-
interference assertions introduced in the previous sections.
The use of unwinding relations on the proof of noninter-
ference has been discussed in the literature [18], [32] which
is based on the assumption that the relation  ⊆ U × U
is transitive. First we show that this result is still valid
for the class of policies that consist of strict assertions.
(Note here the relation  as determined by the set of
assertions is not necessarily transitive.) Given a machine
M = 〈S, s0, step, obs,O〉 and a policy Π consisting of
only strict assertions, a set of unwinding relations {∼u}u∈U
are defined as follows. For each user u ∈ U , ∼u⊆ S × S
is an equivalence relation satisfying the conditions output
consistency (OC), step consistency (SC), and local respect
 (LR).
OC s ∼u t implies obsu(s) = obsu(t).
SC s ∼u t and a ∈ A implies step(s, a) ∼u step(t, a).
LR s ∼u step(s, a) if 〈part(a) 6 u〉 ∈ Π.
The existence of a set of relations {∼u}u∈U that satisfy the
above three properties is both sufficient and necessary for a
system to be secure. The proof method is exactly the same
9 Although noninterference are trace-based properties and unwinding are
bisimulation-based techniques, the unwinding characterizations in this paper
are tight partially because for deterministic systems trace semantics and
bisimulation semantics coincide [41]. Extending unwinding as a complete
characterization for trace-based information flow properties in nondeter-
ministic systems will be challenging, and we leave it as a future work.
as what was presented in [32]. Define a relation u∼⊆ S × S
for each u ∈ U by s u∼ t if obsu(s) = obsu(t).
Theorem 1: Given a policy Π, a system M is secure with
respect to Π iff there exist unwinding relations {∼u}u∈U .
Proof: The ‘if’ direction can be proved by induction
on the length of the input actions in the same style of [32].
For the ‘only if’ direction, if the M is secure, we can show
that the relations
u
≈ defined by s u≈ t if s • α u∼ t •α for all
α ∈ A∗ satisfies OC, SC and LR.
A. Unwinding for Pre-conditional Assertions
We present an unwinding technique which is sound for
policies consisting of pre-conditional assertions defined by
the policy language Φ. This technique is complete for
policies that are left-consistent. Since the policy language
produces a regular set of sequences, for each assertion T
of the form 〈P 6 u [[φpre]]〉, we write A(φ)P,u for the
finite automaton accepting L(φ), and regard A(φ)P,u as the
assertion automaton of T .
We define an additional rule for the unwinding relations
on pre-conditional assertions. Given a machine M in the
form of 〈S, s0, step, obs,O〉 and a policy Π, a set of unwind-
ing relations {∼u}u∈U are equivalence relations satisfying
OC, SC, LR, and the new condition LR≤ which is specified
as follows.
LR≤ s ∼u step(s, a) if 〈part(a) 6 u [[φpre]]〉 ∈ Π and there
exists α ∈ L(φ) such that s = s0 • α.
As LR ensures a partition to follow a strict assertion, the
condition LR≤ ensures the satisfaction of pre-conditional
assertions in general. Intuitively, if a state is reachable
by an action sequence within the language defined by an
assertion, an action that is controlled by that assertion must
be purged. We show that this characterization is sufficient
for a system to be secure with respect to a policy consisting
of only pre-conditional assertions. (As a strict assertion can
also be treated as a pre-conditional assertion by the regular
expression A∗.)
Theorem 2: Given a system M and a policy Π consisting
of only pre-conditional assertions, M is secure if there exists
a set of equivalence relations {∼u}u∈U satisfying OC, SC,
LR and LR≤.
If a given policy is left-consistent, then this characteriza-
tion is also complete.
Theorem 3: Given a system M and a policy Π consisting
of only pre-conditional assertions, if M is secure and Π is
left-consistent, then there exist a set of equivalence relations
{∼u}u∈U satisfying OC, SC, LR and LR≤.
The regularity of the assertion language Φ allows to apply
assertion automata for pre-conditional assertions to mark the
states where LR≤ needs to be applied to purge an action.
This could be done by a parallel composition of the machine
M with the A(φ)P,u for every 〈P 6 u [[φpre]]〉 ∈ Π, which
could be automated in a model checker. Since assertion
automata usually do not contain a lot of states, a local model
checking algorithm is able to detect violations of security
on-the-fly when a system is very large (even possibly
of infinite states). We have the following reduction from
noninterference security properties with policies consisting
of pre-conditional assertions to safety properties.
For an assertion T = 〈P 6 u [[φpre]]〉 ∈ Π, we
assume that an assertion automaton A(φ)T = 〈ST , s(T,0),
→,FT 〉 is deterministic, and accepts the language L(φ).
We assume Π is denumerable as {T1, T2, . . . }. Given a
machine M = 〈S, s0, step, obs,O〉, for each u ∈ U ,
we define a machine MΠu = 〈Su, su0 , stepu, obs
u, dom〉
to be the system with identical actions and domains,
with states Su = S × S × ST1 × ST2 × . . . , initial
state su0 = (s0, s0, s(T1,0), s(T2,0), . . . ), and the observa-
tion function obsu : Su → (O × O) is defined as
obsu(s1, s2, t1, t2, . . . ) = (obsu(s1), obsu(s2)) for s1, s2 ∈
S, and transition function stepu : Su×A → Su is given by
stepu((s1, s2, t1, t2, . . . ), a) = (s
′
1, step(s2, a), t
′
1, t
′
2, . . . )
with a ∈ A and ti
a
−→ t′i for all i, and
s′1 =


s1 if there is Ti = 〈part(a) 6 u [[φpre]]〉
and ti ∈ FTi ,
step(s1, a) otherwise.
Intuitively, in every transition, an action a is not allowed
to apply on the left part of a state pair, if the assertion
automaton controlling part(a) and associated with u is in
its final state. A proof by induction shows that for every
sequence of actions α ∈ A∗, if su0 • α = (s, t, . . . ) in MΠu ,
then in M we have s = s0 • purgeΠ(α, u) and t = s0 • α.
We therefore obtain the following.
Proposition 4: A machine M is secure with respect to a
left-consistent policy Π iff for all u ∈ U and for all states
s in MΠu reachable from su0 , we have that obsu(s) = (o, o′)
implies o = o′.
B. Unwinding for Post-conditional Assertions
In this section we study the unwinding relations for
policies consisting of post-conditional assertions defined by
Φ− as given in Fig. 2. The design of unwinding for this class
of policies is rather involved. Our solution allows possibly
more than one equivalence relations for each user. The
underlying intuition is as follows. If an action a is allowed to
interfere with user u only if it is followed by another action
b, then for each state s, we need to have s and step(s, a)
indistinguishable by u after any sequence of actions that
does not contain b. Based on that, we define a binary relation
[b]
∼u⊆ S × S and let s
[b]
∼u step(s, a) to represent the effect
that state s and state step(s, a) are not distinguishable by
u as long as b is not performed. (i.e., s [b]∼u t implies
step(s, c)
[b]
∼u step(t, c) if c 6= b) Intuitively, such a relation
must be an equivalence relation. For readability we move
some of the proofs in this section into appendix and only
provide explanations about the proofs instead.
Let Π be a policy of post-conditional assertions. For a
user u ∈ U , write the set of assertions associated with u as a
subpolicy Πu ⊆ Π. Let Q = P(Part)∪{♦C | C ⊆ Part}.
Define the set of terms which are suffixes of the given
constraints in Πu as ∆Πu = {λ ∈ Q∗ | ∃λ′ ∈ Q∗, 〈P 6 
u [[[C1 ∪ C2 ∪ · · · ∪ Cn]
post
→ ]]〉 ∈ Πu : λ
′ · λ = Ci ∧
i ∈ [1 . . . n]}. Intuitively, this is the suffix closure of the
set of post-conditional channels that allow to downgrade
information from some partition to u. The set of unwinding
relations for a user u ∈ U is { δ∼u| δ ⊆ ∆Πu }, which are the
equivalence relations satisfying the following rules.
OC s δ∼u t implies s
u
∼ t for all δ ⊆ ∆Πu with δ ∩ {ǫ} = ∅.
SC+ If s δ∼u t and a ∈ A, then step(s, a)
sc(δ,a)
∼ u step(s, a).
LR 〈part(a) 6 u〉 ∈ Π implies s ∅∼u step(s, a).
LR≥ 〈part(a) 6 u [[[λ1 ∪ λ2 ∪ . . . λn]post→ ]]〉 ∈ Π implies
s
{λ1,λ2,...λn}
∼ u step(s, a).
SUB For all δ1, δ2 ∈ P(∆Πu ), δ1 ⊆ δ2 implies
δ1∼⊆
δ2∼.
The function sc : P(∆Πu ) × A → P(∆Πu ) is defined as
sc(δ) =
⋃
λ∈δ cut(λ, a), where the cut function is defined
as follows. Given P ∈ P(Part) and λ ∈ Q∗,
• cut(ǫ, a) = {ǫ} for all a ∈ A,
• cut(P · λ, a) = {λ} if a ∈ P ,
• cut(P · λ, a) = ∅ if a 6∈ P ,
• cut(♦P · λ, a) = {λ} if a ∈ P ,
• cut(♦P · λ, a) = {♦P · λ} if a 6∈ P .
The condition OC asserts that all such relations containing
unfinished downgrading channels to u (with ǫ ∈ δ) must be
contained in u∼, i.e., they shall not currently be distinguished
by u. The definition of the SC+ rule follows the mechanism
of pattern matching which simulates the process of purging.
For example, if s {♦Pλ}∼ u t, then after an action a ∈ P is
performed, step(s, a) and step(t, a) needs to be related by
the relation {λ}∼ u, indicating that an action in P has been
performed and that the rest of the downgrading channel is
λ. The states can be related by two downgrading channels,
e.g. s {λ,λ
′}
∼ u t, indicating the two possibilities to effect
the view (or to relax the indistinguishability relation) of
u. When two states are related by a set with a completed
channel, e.g., s δ∼u t with ǫ ∈ δ, then s and t need not
be indistinguishable to u any more. Plainly δ∼u= S × S if
ǫ ∈ δ, where S is the state space of a machine. Informally,
condition SUB indicates that the more channels a relation
carries, the weaker policies that relation represents. As ∅∼u
is the smallest such relation for user u ∈ U , it represents
strict noninterference, so that u can never distinguish two
states that are related by his own future behaviours. For a
suffix constraint λ in the form of Cλ′ or ♦Cλ′, write I(λ)
for C which is the first set of actions to check in λ. We have
the following property for function sc.
Lemma 4: For all λ ∈ sc(δ, a), we have at least one of the
following conditions hold.
1) λ = ǫ and λ ∈ δ,
2) λ ∈ δ with a 6∈ I(λ),
3) Cλ ∈ δ with a ∈ C,
4) ♦Cλ ∈ δ with a ∈ C.
Lemma 5: For all δ1, δ2 ∈ P(∆Πu ) and u ∈ U , s
δ1∼u t and
t
δ2∼u r implies s
δ1∪δ2∼ u r.
Proof: By the rule SUB we have δ1∼⊆δ1∪δ2∼ and
δ2∼⊆
δ1∪δ2∼ , therefore s δ1∪δ2∼ u t and t
δ1∪δ2∼ u r. Then
s
δ1∪δ2∼ u r by transitivity of the relation
δ1∪δ2∼ u.
Similar to the pre-conditional constraints, every post-
conditional constraint can be regarded as a pattern in regular
expression, such that an action must not be purged if it
is followed by a sequence of actions within the pattern
characterized by the constraint. Define an interpretation
operator [.] : Φ− → (P(A))∗, by [ǫ] = A∗, [Cλ] = C[λ],
and [♦Cλ] = (A\C)∗C[λ] for C ⊆ A, where λ ∈ (P(A))∗.
Lemma 6: Given a system M , a user u ∈ U , and a policy
Π with only post-conditional assertions, if there exists a set
of relations { δ∼u}δ⊆∆Π
u
,u∈U satisfying OC, LR, LR≥, SC+
and SUB, then for all s, t ∈ S and α ∈ A∗ \
⋃
λ∈δ[λ]
with s δ∼ t and δ ⊆ ∆Πu satisfying δ ∩ {ǫ} = ∅, we have
s • α
u
∼ t • purgeΠ(α, u).
The proof of this lemma is by induction on the length of
an action sequence on states that are related by all possible
sets of incomplete channels. From Lem. 6 one can obtain
the soundness result.
Theorem 4: Given a system M , a user u ∈ U , and a policy
Π with only post-conditional assertions, if there exists a set
of relations { δ∼u}δ⊆∆Π
u
,u∈U satisfying OC, LR, LR≥, SC
and SUB, then M is secure with respect to Π.
Proof: We need to show for all u ∈ U and α ∈ A∗, we
have s0 • α
u
∼ s0 • purgeΠ(α, u). Since
∅
∼u is reflexive we
have s0
∅
∼u s0, then the result directly follows by Lem. 6.
Note
⋃
λ∈∅[λ] = ∅.
To establish a completeness result, we study the set of
relations {
δ
≈u}δ∈∆Π
u
specified as follows. Define δ≈u⊆ S×S,
such that s
δ
≈u t if for all α ∈ A∗ satisfying α 6∈ [λ]
for all λ ∈ δ, s • α u∼ t • α. We regard { δ≈u}δ∈∆Π
u
as
the relations that characterize information flow security for
post-conditional assertions, with some nice properties that
are guaranteed by Lem. 7.
Lemma 7: For each user u ∈ U in system M , the set of
relations { δ≈u}δ∈∆Π
u
satisfies OC, SC+ and SUB.
Finally we are able to prove that the existence of such
unwinding relations is also necessary for a system to be
secure, provided that the given policy consisting of post-
conditional assertions is right-consistent. The methodology
on proving Thm. 5 is that OC, SC+ and SUB conditions
determine a set of the largest bisimulation-like relations { δ≈u
}δ⊆∆Π
u
on the state space for each u, then LR and LR≥
conditions assert that noninterfering actions do not make
transitions that go beyond each equivalent class. We leave
the detailed proof in the appendix.
Theorem 5: Given a system M with a right-consistent
policy Π consisting of post-conditional assertions, if M is
secure with respect to Π, then there exists a set of relations
{
δ
∼u}δ⊆∆Π
u
satisfying OC, LR, LR≥, SC+ and SUB for all
u ∈ U .
C. A Case Study on Unwinding
We take the policy as introduced in example 2 and show
how to construct unwinding relations in this simple system
to ensure integrity of data-base operations. Suppose there are
a finite number of employees E = {E1, E2 . . . Em} working
with a database B with finite entries X = {x1, x2, . . . xn}
each of which stores a natural number. The action set
available to Ei is ArEi∪A
w
Ei
∪{abkEi}, where A
r
Ei
= {r(i, x) |
x ∈ X} and AwEi = {w(i, x, v) | x ∈ X}. The state space
is S = ({succ, deny, ready,⊥} ∪ N)E × NX , so that a
state s = (o1, o2, . . . om, d1, d2, . . . dn) is a snapshot of all
employee’s observations as well as the contents in database
B. In this case we write s(i) for Ei’s observation and s(xj)
for the j-th entry of B in s. The observation function for B
(as a user) is thus obsB(s) = (s(x1), s(x2), . . . s(xn)), and
obsEi(s) = s(i). Write s[t 7→ v] for a state identical to s
except that s[t 7→ v](t) = v. The initial state s0 is defined
as s0(i) = ⊥ for all i ∈ 1 . . .m, and s0(xj) = 0 for all
xj ∈ X . The transition function is defined as follows. For
all i ∈ 1 . . .m and xk ∈ X ,
• step(s, r(i, xk)) = s[s(i) 7→ s(xk)][∀j 6= i : s(j) 7→
⊥],
• step(s, w(i, xk, v)) = s[s(i) 7→ deny][∀j 6= i : s(j) 7→
⊥] if s[i] 6= ready, and step(s, w(i, xk, v)) = s[s(i) 7→
succ][s(xk) = v][∀i : s(i) 7→ ⊥] otherwise,
• step(s, abkEi) = s[s(i) 7→ ready][∀j 6= i : s(j) 7→ ⊥].
where [∀j 6= i : s(i) 7→ ⊥] is short for [s(1) 7→ ⊥] . . . [s(i−
1) 7→ ⊥][s(i + 1) 7→ ⊥] . . . [s(m) 7→ ⊥], which sets all
users except i’s observation to ⊥. Informally, abkEi acquires
a unique write-permission for Ei by setting i’s observation
to ready and simultaneously removing all other employees’
ability to write.
Recalling the security policy of example 2, we have
the following three rules to ensure integrity of B. For all
Ei, (1) reading actions do not modify B: 〈ArEi 6 B〉,(2) writing actions take effect only by immediately fol-
lowing a book-keeping action: 〈AwEi 6 B [[[a
bk
Ei
]preց ]]〉, and
(3) book-keeping does not have side effects: 〈{abkEi} 6 
B [[[AwEi ]
post
→ ]]〉.
We treat (1) and (2) as pre-conditional assertions, by
defining an equivalence relation ∼B as follows.10 Let s ∼B t
if obsB(s) = obsB(t) and for all 1 ≤ i ≤ m, either
s(i) = t(i) = ready, or s(i) 6= ready and t(i) 6= ready.
10Since the policy is not designed to protect the employees, we only
study the unwinding relations for B.
We show that ∼B is an unwinding relation for assertions (1)
and (2).
• OC is trivial.
• For SC, if s ∼B t, then for all 1 ≤ i ≤ m,
(1) step(s, r(i, x)) ∼B step(t, r(i, x)), because r(i, x)
only sets Ei’s observation to s(x) which is the same
as t(x) by definition, and (2) step(s, w(i, x, v)) ∼B
step(t, w(i, x, v)), since the writing action either
changes both item x to v, or fails to change both,
and (3) step(s, abkEi) ∼B step(t, abkEi), since the book-
keeping action only sets both states as ready for Ei to
write, and resets all other observations to ⊥.
• For LR, it is obvious that s ∼B step(s, r(i, x)) for all
i and x.
• For LR≤, the language L([abkEi ]
pre
ց ) is expressed as
A∗(A \ {abkEi}). Then we have that for all α ∈
A∗(A \ {abkEi}) and action a in the form of w(i, x, v),
step(s0 • α, a) ∼B s0 • α (Since no one is ready in
s0 • α and no one is ready in step(s0 • α, a)).
Assertion (3) is post-conditional, for which we establish the
following relations.
-
{ǫ}
∼ B=
{Aw
Ei
,ǫ}
∼ = S × S for all i.
- s
{Aw
Ei
}
∼ B t if obsB(s) = obsB(t), and for all j 6= i,
either s(j) = t(j) = ready, or s(j) 6= ready and
t(j) 6= ready. (i.e., only Ei’s observation is relaxed
from the constraints imposed on ∼B.)
-
∅
∼B is defined as ∼B.
We show this set of relations are unwinding relations for
assertion (3).
• OC and SUB are trivial.
• For SC+, the case for δ∼B with ǫ ∈ δ is trivial, since
in this case δ∼B= S × S. Let s
{Aw
Ei
}
∼ B t, then for all
a ∈ A\AwEi , we need to show step(s, a)
∅
∼B step(t, a).
This is straightforward because the only possibility to
prevent s to be related to t by ∅∼B is that they disagree
on Ei’s observation, and every action a ∈ A\AwEi will
set Ei’s observation to the same value in step(s, a) and
step(t, a) without modifying B’s contents.
• For LR≥, for all s ∈ S, only Ei’s view is changed to
ready in step(s, abkEi), thus s
{Aw
Ei
}
∼ B step(s, abkEi) by
definition.
By establishing the unwinding relations, Thm. 2 and
Thm. 4 guarantee that the system is secure with respect to the
given policy. Moreover, one can still prove that the existence
of such unwinding relations is complete for this particular
policy in this example, by applying the techniques used in
the proofs of Thm. 3 and Thm. 5. As the policy discussed
in this example is neither left-consistent nor right-consistent
(which can be shown from the purge function derived from
the policy)11, this serves as an example showing that left-
and right-consistencies are not always necessary for a policy
to be completely characterizable by the unwinding relations
defined in this paper.
V. RELATED WORK
Conditional noninterference was first proposed by Goguen
and Meseguer [17]. Our work extends their definition to a
more general form, such that the control of information flow
can be placed either before or after the actions with intended
flow. The notion of intransitive noninterference was first
proposed by Haigh and Young [21], and later revised by
Rushby [32]. Our policy defined by post-conditional asser-
tions are strictly more expressive than that of intransitive
noninterference, which has been sketched in Sect. III-E.
Nevertheless, the unwinding theorems presented for this
more general policy is both sound and complete in a very
general sense (we believe that action-based channel control
policies are usually supposed to be consistent), while the
weak unwinding relation [32] fails to be complete for
intransitive noninterference in the literature. The unwinding
technique of Mantel [23] is sound for a spectrum of trace-
based properties [22], but it is also not complete. A few other
works extend Rushby’s weak unwinding in nondeterministic
language-based settings [25], [24]. The result in this paper
is based on systems with deterministic transition functions,
but it will be straightforward to extend the definitions of
our policies for both pre-conditional assertions and post-
conditional assertions in nondeterministic systems, possibly
by revising the unwinding rule SC (or SC+) in the way of
bisimulation [27]12.
Bossi et al. extended the unwinding-based characterization
for the security properties in SPA [14], [16] to support
downgrading [6]. They described a policy for three security
levels including H (High level user), D (Downgrader)
and L (low level user) by applying unwinding to disallow
information flow from H to L without putting any constraint
on D. Their approach is basically Goguen and Meseguer’s
strict noninterference policies [17] (as we sketched in ex-
ample 1) in a nondeterministic environment with silent
system moves. With respect to persistency [16], our policies
by post-conditional assertions are inherently persistent, i.e.,
if a system is secure with respect to such policies then
it is secure if every reachable state is a possible initial
state. However, our policies by pre-conditional assertions
are not necessarily persistent by definition.13 Roscoe and
Goldsmith [31] generalized the determinism based notion
11Nevertheless, it is obvious that the pre-conditional part of the policy is
left-consistent, and the post-conditional part of the policy is right-consistent,
which helps to establish a proof for completeness.
12However, achieving completeness might be very nontrivial for unwind-
ing in nondeterministic systems for trace-based properties.
13In this case, we claim that it is sufficient to verify the persistent version
of a pre-conditional assertion φ by examining a policy automaton accepting
the language L(φ)′ = {α · α′ | α ∈ A∗ ∧ α′ ∈ L(φ)}.
of noninterference [30] to intransitive noninterference with
three security levels in process algebra CSP. Their property
is potentially stronger than most of the existing intransitive
noninterference properties in literature [36].
Van der Meyden developed a new set of intransitive
noninterference properties to reason about information flow
epistemically [38]. As it was identified that Haigh and
Young’s intransitive flow property [21] may allow a down-
grader to pass information from high level to low level
without knowing what is to be downgraded, a number of
new intransitive noninterference properties are introduced
to catch the idea that a downgrader’s knowledge about the
secret information should be no less than what the low
level user is able to get. The new properties defined by
van der Meyden are stronger than intransitive noninterfer-
ence [21], [32] and weaker than (strict) noninterference [17].
Our framework lies in a different dimension, in that we
extend the framework of [17], [32] to support more flexible
policies without much concern on a user’s knowledge.
The methodologies for declassification of secret informa-
tion have been surveyed by Sabelfeld and Sands [34], in
which all related works are classified into four different
dimensions: (1) who releases information, (2) what infor-
mation is released (3) where in the system information is
released and (4) when information can be released. Although
most of the surveyed works are in the language-based
setting, the classification seems to make sense in the state-
based models as well. Our policy design supports the who
dimension, by assigning a partition of a particular user in
a policy to control information flow to a user, and also
the where and when dimensions, by controlling information
release only after a downgrading channel is fully established
(such as allowed by post-conditional assertions). In terms
of flexibility, as this framework does not assume a central-
ized security policy, it is possible to express integrity for
decentralized flow control [28], by assigning users privileged
actions to switch on and off writing permits to the files they
own. However as our policy is action-based, it might not be
convenient to express decentralized confidentiality policies.
More recently, Chong and Myers [8] define declassification
and erasure policies that specify conditions under which
information may be downgraded, or must be erased. Instead
of binding policies on information, our pre-conditional poli-
cies focus on the control over the source and destination of
information flow, by adding and removing permits from an
action partition of a user via controlling actions.
Hadj-Alouane et al. studied verification of intransitive
noninterference property in finite state systems [20]. In
order to verify the property, they reduce a system into an
automaton accepting the reversed language, which poten-
tially consumes space exponential to the size of the system.
Pinsky also proposed an algorithm to verify noninterference
properties [29]. However that algorithm only works for
transitive policies, but fails when the underlying information
flow relation is intransitive. A new algorithm for intransitive
noninterference is proposed by van der Meyden [37] which
has a complexity bound polynomial to the size of a machine
but exponential to the number of users. Verification on
our unwinding relations for post-conditional assertions can
be done in-place, therefore it is also polynomial time to
the size of a system, but it could be exponential to the
size of a policy (as shown in the subset construction on
the set of post-conditional assertions when constructing
unwinding relations). Nevertheless, our policies are strictly
more general than intransitive noninterference policies, as
shown in Sect. III-E. It will also be interesting to investigate
algorithmic verification methods on generating unwinding
relations in more general systems (i.e., systems that are
not necessarily finite state), as it has been shown that
verification of Mantel’s BSPs [22] in push-down systems
is undecidable [13]. The methodologies on reducing infor-
mation flow properties to safety by self-composition have
been discussed in the literature [2], [35], [11], [40], for a
variety of system models.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
This work introduces a framework of information flow
policies by noninterference assertions which generalizes
existing work of both transitive and intransitive noninter-
ference. Although noninterference is in general defined as
a static security notion, we applied our policy language
to express a number of dynamic security requirements
including upgrading, downgrading and channel control.
Our unwinding theorems on both pre-conditional and post-
conditional assertions are novel, and they are more precise
and more general than the existing results in the literature,
to our knowledge.
There is a possible future direction to extend our policy
by allowing clock ticks to act as upgrading or downgrading
channels. This will make it possible to express time-based
control in real-time systems, which might be an interesting
future work to explore both upgrading and downgrading in
the when dimension of [34].
There are plenty of extensions of noninterference in non-
deterministic and probabilistic systems, and this will be an
interesting future work for conditional noninterference. Also
we believe that it will be of interest to find real cases where
our unwinding theorems (or any suitable extensions) can be
applied to verify their corresponding security requirements
in more general systems. Furthermore, it is also possible to
enrich our policy by incorporating state information into the
policy language in a concrete system verification. Again, this
will be of more interest in a sensible case study in the future.
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APPENDIX
This appendix contains the proofs of some results pre-
sented in the article.
Proof: (of Prop. 2) We prove by induction on the
length of an action sequence. Base case: ipurge(ǫ, u) =
purgeΠ( )(ǫ, u) = ǫ.
Suppose ipurge(α, u) = purgeΠ( )(α, u) for some
α ∈ A∗, we show the case for a · α with a ∈ A. If
α contains an interference chain from dom(a) to u, then
ipurge(a · α, u) = a · ipurge(α, u). Also purgeΠ( )(a ·
α, u) = a · purgeΠ( )(α, u), since the purging of the
actions in α does not depend on a, and Π( ) contains
a condensed interference chain from dom(a) to u by def-
inition. If α does not contain an interference chain from
dom(a) to u, then ipurge(a · α, u) = ipurge(α, u) and
purgeΠ( )(a · α, u) = purgeΠ( )(α, u). In both cases we
have ipurge(a · α, u) = purgeΠ( )(a · α, u).
Proof: (of Lem. 2) The ‘if’ direction is trivial, since
ipurge(α, v) is contained in α. For the ‘only if’ direction,
suppose α′ = a1a2 . . . an is an interference chain from u to
v in α, it can be shown by induction on every suffix of α′
that all actions in α′ will stay in the sequence ipurge(α, v).
Proof: (of Lem. 3) By induction on length of α. Base
case is trivial.
Suppose ipurge(ipurge(α, u), u) = ipurge(α, u), we
show the case for a · α.
• If α contains an interference chain from dom(a)
to u, then ipurge(α, u) also contains an inter-
ference chain from dom(a) to u by Lem. 2.
Therefore we have ipurge(ipurge(a · α, u), u) =
ipurge(a·ipurge(α, u), u) = a·ipurge(ipurge(α, u), u)
and ipurge(a · α, u) = a · ipurge(α, u). Since
ipurge(α, u) = ipurge(ipurge(α, u), u), we get
ipurge(a · α, u) = ipurge(ipurge(a · α, u), u) by in-
duction hypothesis.
• If α does not contain an interference chain from
dom(a) to u, then ipurge(α, u) also does not con-
tain an interference chain from dom(a) to u by
Lem. 2. Therefore ipurge(ipurge(a · α, u), u) =
ipurge(ipurge(α, u), u) and ipurge(a · α, u) =
ipurge(α, u). Then we have ipurge(a · α, u) =
ipurge(ipurge(a · α, u), u) by induction hypothesis.
Proof: (of Thm. 2) We show that if there exist relations
{∼u}u∈U satisfying OC, SC, LR and LR≤, then for all u ∈
U , α ∈ A∗, s0 • α ∼u s0 • purgeΠ(α, u), then by OC we
will have s0 • α
u
∼ s0 • purgeΠ(α, u). we prove this by
induction on the length of the action sequences. For α = ǫ,
purgeΠ(α) = α = ǫ, we have s0 ∼u s0 by the fact that ∼u
is reflexive. Suppose for some α ∈ A∗ we have s0 • α ∼u
s0 • purgeΠ(α, u), we show the case for α · a.
• If purgeΠ(α · a, u) = purgeΠ(α, u), we have the
following two cases: (1) 〈part(a) 6 u〉 ∈ Π, (2)
〈part(a) 6 u [[φpre]]〉 ∈ Π and α ∈ L(φ). In
both cases we have s0 • α ∼u s0 • (α · a) by LR
(or LR≤). With the induction hypothesis s0 • α ∼u
s0 • purgeΠ(α · a, u), by transitivity of ∼u, we have
s0 • (α · a) ∼u s0 • purgeΠ(α · a, u).
• Otherwise, we have purgeΠ(α ·a, u) = purgeΠ(α, u) ·
a. Then by the induction hypothesis and SC, we have
s0 • (α · a) ∼u s0 • (purgeΠ(α, u) · a), therefore s0 •
(α · a) ∼u s0 • purgeΠ(α · a, u).
Proof: (of Thm. 3) Suppose M is secure, we show that
the relations {∼u}u∈U defined by s ∼u t if for all α ∈ A∗,
s • α
u
∼ t • α satisfy OC, SC, LR and LR≤.
• For OC, let α = ǫ, then we have s ∼u t implies s
u
∼ t.
• For SC, let s ∼u t and a ∈ A, if step(s, a) 6∼u
step(t, a), then there exists α ∈ A∗ such that
step(s, a)•α 6
u
∼ step(t, a)•α, then s•(a·α) 6 u∼ t•(a·α)
which contradicts s ∼u t. Therefore step(s, a) ∼u
step(t, a).
• For LR≤, let 〈P 6 u [[φpre]]〉 ∈ Π. If there exists
a ∈ P and s ∈ S such that s0 • α, α ∈ L(φ)
and s 6∼u step(s, a), then there exists α′ ∈ A∗ such
that s0 • α • α′ 6
u
∼ step(s0 • α, a) • α
′
, which is
equivalent to that s0 • (α · α′) 6
u
∼ s0 • (α · a · α′).
However, since policy Π is left-consistent, we have
purgeΠ(α·α
′, u) = purgeΠ(purgeΠ(α, u)·α
′, u), and
purgeΠ(α·a·α
′, u) = purgeΠ(purgeΠ(α·a, u)·α
′, u).
Then purgeΠ(α · α′, u) = purgeΠ(α · a · α′, u) by
purgeΠ(α, u) = purgeΠ(α·a, u), i.e., α·α′ and α·a·α′
have the same purged result with respect to u. Therefore
we have either s0 • (α ·α′) 6
u
∼ s0 •purgeΠ(α ·α
′, u), or
s0 •(α ·a ·α′) 6
u
∼ s0 •purgeΠ(α ·a ·α
′, u), contradicting
the assumption that M is secure.
• The case of LR is similar to LR≤.
Proof: (of Lem. 6) We prove by induction on length of
α. Base case: α = ǫ, then purgeΠ(ǫ, u) = ǫ, we have s
δ
∼u t
implies s u∼ t by OC for every δ ∩ {ǫ} = ∅. Suppose this
holds for an action sequence α on all states s, t, δ ⊆ ∆Πu
with δ∩{ǫ} = ∅, such that s δ∼u t with α ∈ A∗\
⋃
λ∈δ[λ], we
show the case for a ·α. Let s δ∼u t with a ·α ∈ A∗\
⋃
λ∈δ[λ]
and δ ∩ {ǫ} = ∅.
• If purgeΠ(a · α, u) = a · purgeΠ(α, u), then we have
step(s, a)
sc(δ,a)
∼ u step(t, a). First we show that ǫ 6∈
sc(δ, a). Because if ǫ ∈ sc(δ, a), then by Lem. 4, either
(1) ǫ ∈ δ, or (2) there is C or ♦C in δ such that a ∈ [C]
or a ∈ [♦C], which implies a ·α ∈ [C] or a ·α ∈ [♦C].
Case (1) contradicts the assumption that δ ∩ {ǫ} = ∅,
and case (2) contradicts the assumption that a·α ∈ A∗\⋃
λ∈δ[λ]. Next we show for all λ ∈ sc(δ, a), α 6∈ [λ].
Because if there were λ ∈ sc(δ, a) such that α ∈ [λ],
by Lem. 4, we would have the following cases: (1) if
λ ∈ δ with a 6∈ I(λ), then a ·α ∈ [λ]; (2) if Cλ ∈ δ or
♦Cλ ∈ δ with a ∈ C, then a·α ∈ [Cλ] or a·α ∈ [♦Cλ].
Both cases contradict the assumption that a · α ∈ A∗ \⋃
λ∈δ[λ]. Therefore for all λ ∈ sc(δ, a), α 6∈ [λ], i.e.,
α ∈ A∗ \
⋃
λ∈sc(δ,a)[λ]. Then by induction hypothesis,
we have step(s, a) • α u∼ step(t, a) • purgeΠ(α, u).
Therefore s • (a · α) u∼ t • purgeΠ(a · α, u).
• If purgeΠ(a · α, u) = purgeΠ(α, u), we have the
following two cases.
– If 〈part(a) 6 u〉 ∈ Π, then by LR, we have
s
∅
∼ step(s, a), then step(s, a) δ∼ t by Lem. 5.
By induction hypothesis, we have step(s, a)•α δ∼
t • purgeΠ(α, u), then we have s • (a · α)
u
∼
t • purgeΠ(a · α, u).
– If 〈part(a) 6 u [[[λ1 ∪ λ2 ∪ · · · ∪ λn]post→ ]]〉 ∈ Π
and α 6∈ [λi] for all i ∈ [1 . . . n]. By LR≥, we
have step(s, a) {λ1,λ2,...λn}∼ u s. Then we have
step(s, a)
δ∪{λ1,λ2,...λn}
∼ t by Lem. 5. Since α 6∈ λ′
for all λ′ ∈ δ, and α 6∈ [λi] for all i by assumption,
we have α ∈ A∗ \
⋃
λ′∈δ∪{λ1,λ2,...λn}
[λ′]. Then
by induction hypothesis, we get step(s, a) • α u∼
t • (purgeΠ(α, u)), therefore s • (a · α)
u
∼ t •
purgeΠ(a · α, u).
Proof: (of Lem. 7)
• For OC, let δ ⊆ ∆Πu be a set that does not contain ǫ
and s δ≈u t. Since ǫ 6∈ [λ] for all λ ∈ ∆Πu \ {ǫ}, we
have s • ǫ u∼ t • ǫ. Therefore s u∼ t.
• For SUB, let s δ≈u t and δ ⊆ δ′ ⊆ ∆Πu , we need to show
s
δ′
≈ t. Since δ ⊆ δ′, we have
⋃
λ∈δ[λ] ⊆
⋃
λ∈δ′ [λ], so
A∗ \
⋃
λ∈δ′ [λ] ⊆ A
∗ \
⋃
λ∈δ[λ]. By s
δ
≈u t, we have
s •α
u
∼ t •α for all α ∈ A∗ \
⋃
λ∈δ[λ], so s •α
u
∼ t •α
for all α ∈ A∗ \
⋃
λ∈δ′ [λ]. Then we have s
δ′
≈ t by
definition.
• For SC+, let s δ≈u t and a ∈ A, we study the following
cases on the relations which may relate step(s, a) and
step(t, a).
– If ǫ ∈ δ, then by definition
{ǫ}
≈ u= S×S, therefore
step(s, a)
{ǫ}
≈ u step(t, a).
– If Pλ ∈ δ and a ∈ P , then for all α ∈ A∗ \ [λ],
step(s, a)•α
u
∼ step(t, a)•α, because if not, then
we would have s • (a · α) 6 u∼ t • (a · α) such that
a · α 6∈ [Pλ]. Therefore step(s, a)
{λ}
≈ u step(t, a).
– If Pλ ∈ δ and a 6∈ P , then we have step(s, a) •
α
u
∼ step(t, a) • α for all α ∈ A∗, because if not,
then we would have s•(a ·α) 6 u∼ t•(a ·α) such that
a · α 6∈ [Pλ]. Therefore step(s, a)
∅
≈u step(t, a).
– If ♦Pλ ∈ δ and a ∈ P , then we have step(s, a) •
α
u
∼ step(t, a) • α for all α ∈ A∗ \ [λ], which
is similar to the case of Pλ ∈ δ. Therefore
step(s, a)
{λ}
≈ u step(t, a).
– If ♦Pλ ∈ δ and a 6∈ P , then we have step(s, a) •
α
u
∼ step(t, a)•α for all α ∈ A∗ \ [♦Pλ], because
if not, then we would have s • (a · α) 6 u∼ t • (a · α)
with a · α 6∈ [♦Pλ]. Therefore step(s, a)
{♦Pλ}
≈ u
step(t, a).
The above cases give us cut(λ, a) for every member
λ ∈ δ. By SUB we take the union of all the single-
ton and empty sets to get (step(s, a), step(t, a)) ∈⋃
λ∈δ cut(λ, a). Therefore step(s, a)
sc(δ,a)
∼ step(t, a)
by definition.
Proof: (of Thm. 5) Suppose M is secure with respect
to Π, then for each u ∈ U the relation {
δ
≈u}δ⊆∆Π
u
satisfy
OC, SC+ and SUB by Lem. 7. Then we only need to show
they also satisfy LR and LR≥ in the following cases.
• Suppose the relations do not satisfy LR for some u ∈
U , then there exists a reachable state s and an assertion
〈part(a) 6 u〉 ∈ Π such that step(s, a) 6
∅
≈u s. There-
fore there exists some α ∈ A∗ such that step(s, a) 6 u∼ s.
Since s is reachable we have s = s0 •α′ for some α′ ∈
A∗. Then we have s0•(α′ ·a·α) 6
u
∼ s0•(α′ ·α). However
purgeΠ(α
′ ·a·α, u) = purgeΠ(α
′ ·purgeΠ(a·α, u), u),
and purgeΠ(α′ ·α, u) = purgeΠ(α′ ·purgeΠ(α, u), u)
by right-consistency of Π. Since purgeΠ(a · α, u) =
purgeΠ(α, u) by 〈part(a) 6 u〉 ∈ Π, we have
purgeΠ(α
′ · a · α, u) = purgeΠ(α
′ · α, u). By the
assumption that M is secure, we have s0 • (α′ ·a ·α)
u
∼
s0•purgeΠ(α
′ ·a·α, u) and s0•(α′ ·α, u)
u
∼ s0•(α′ ·α).
Then we have s0 • (α′ · a · α)
u
∼ s0 • (α′ · α),
which is contradiction. Therefore we have the relations
{
δ
≈u}δ⊆∆Π
u
satisfying LR for all u ∈ U .
• Suppose the relations do not satisfy LR≥, then there
exists a reachable state s and an assertion 〈part(a) 6 
u [[[λ]post→ ]]〉 such that step(s, a) 6
{λ}
≈ u s. So there exists
α ∈ A∗ \ [λ], such that s • (a · α) 6 u∼ s • α. Since s is
reachable, there exists α′ ∈ A∗ such that s0 • α′ = s.
Therefore we have s0 • (α′ · a ·α) 6
u
∼ s0 • (α′ ·α). Also
since α ∈ A∗ \ [λ], by definition purgeΠ(a · α, u) =
purgeΠ(α, u). Then we have purgeΠ(α′ · a · α, u) =
purge(α′ ·α, u). The rest of the proof is similar to the
above case.
